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Introduction

1. The background of two centuries

• The tyranny of plunder
• Rise of the magazine system
• The age of linear warfare
• 'An umbilical cord of supply'?

2. 'An army marches on its stomach!'

• The end of siege warfare
• Boulogne to Austerlitz
• Many roads to Moscow
• Conclusions

3. When demigods rode rails

• Supply from Napoleon to Moltke
• A joker in the pack
• Railways against France
• Logistics of the armed horde
• Did wheels roll for victory

4. The wheel that broke

• State of the art
• Logistics of the Schlieffen Plan
• The plan modified
• Logistics during the campaign of the Marne
• State of the railroads
• Strength and reinforcement of the right wing
• Conclusions

5. Russian roulette

• Problems of the semi-motorized army
• Planning for 'Barbarossa'
• Leningrad to the Dnieper
• 'Storm to the gates of Moscow'?
• Conclusions

6. Sirte to Alamein

• Desert complications
• Rommel's first offensive
• 1942: Annus Mirabilis
• Conclusions; supply and operations in Africa

7. War of the accountants

• The pitfalls of planning
• Normandy to the Seine
• 'Broad Front' or 'knifelike thrust'?
• Conclusions

8. Logistics in perspective

Postscript: Where are we now?

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• III
• IV

Main purpose:

This chapter looks at Allied logistics in Europe during World War 2, and focuses on two issues. First, it discusses the Allied tendency to over-plan logistics. Second, it examines whether there would have been enough logistical support to end the war earlier with a "knifelike thrust" to the Ruhr River, deep in Germany.